Abstract. Camellia, a 128-bit block cipher which has been accepted by ISO/IEC as an international standard, is increasingly being used in many cryptographic applications. In this paper, using the redundancy in the key schedule and accelerating the filtration of wrong pairs, we present a new impossible differential attack to reduced-round Camellia. By this attack 12-round Camellia-128 without F L/F L −1 functions and whitening is breakable with a total complexity of about 2 116.6 encryptions and 2 116.3 chosen plaintexts. In terms of the numbers of the attacked rounds, our attack is better than any previously known attack on Camellia-128.
Introduction
Camellia [1] is a 128-bit block cipher that supports several key lengths. For the sake of simplicity, Camellia with n-bit keys is denoted by Camellia-n, n=128, 192, 256. Camellia was jointly proposed in 2000 by NTT and Mitsubishi and then was submitted to several standardization and evaluation projects. It was selected as a winner of CRYPTREC e-government recommended ciphers in 2002 [5] , NESSIE block cipher portfolio in 2003 [17] as well as the standardization activities at IETF [18] . Finally Camellia was selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC in 2005 [9] . As one of the most widely used block ciphers, Camellia has received a significant amount of cryptanalytic attention. The most efficient cryptanalytic results on Camellia include linear and differential attacks [19] , truncated differential attack [5, 10, 13, 20] , higher order differential attack [7, 11] , collision attack [14, 21] , square attack [8, 14, 24] , a square like attack [6] and impossible differential attack [15, 20, 22, 23] .
Impossible differential cryptanalysis, an extension of the differential attack [4] , is one of the most powerful methods used for block cipher cryptanalysis. This method was first introduced by Biham [3] and Knudsen [12] independently. Impossible differential attacks use differentials that hold with probability zero (impossible differentials) to eliminate the wrong keys and leave the right key.
The most efficient impossible differential attacks, recently proposed to reduced variants of Camellia, are as follows. The initial analysis of the security of Camellia to impossible differential cryptanalysis was given in [20] . They presented some 7-round impossible differentials for Camellia. In [23] [16] . Later in [22] Wu et al. found a flaw in [16] and presented an impossible differential attack on 12-round Camellia-128 and claimed that their attack has a data complexity of 2 65 chosen plaintexts and a time complexity of about 2 111.5 encryptions. In this paper, we point out a flaw in their attack and show that its time complexity is more than exhaustive key search. However, their work is the first impossible differential attack on Camellia that considers the weakness in its key schedule.
In this paper, using the same 8-round impossible differential of [23] , considering the weakness in the key schedule of Camellia-128, and also exploiting a hash table to simplify the selection of proper pairs, we present the first successful 12-round attack on Camellia-128. The proposed attack requires 2 116.3 chosen plaintexts and has a total time complexity equivalent to about 2 116.6 encryptions. We summarize our results along with previously known results on Camellia-128 in Table 1 . The results of [16] in Table 1 come from its early version reported in Lu's PhD thesis [15] , so we mark them with " †". In this table, time complexity is measured in encryption units unless MA is mentioned for memory accesses.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief description of Camellia. We propose our new impossible differential attack on 12-round Camellia-128 in Section 3. Section 3 includes the previously known 8-round impossible differential (in Subsection 3.1), some observations on the key schedule of Camellia-128 (in Subsection 3.2), the proposed attack procedure on 12-round Impossible Diff. This work Camellia-128 (in Subsection 3.3), and the analysis of the attack complexity (in Subsection 3.4). Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 4.
Preliminaries

Notations
In this paper, we will use the following notations:
: the left 64-bit half of the r-th round input, R : the rotation of x by l bits to the left.
Description of Camellia
The 128-bit block cipher Camellia [1] has an 18-round (for 128 bit keys) or 24-round (for 192/256-bit keys) Feistel structure. The F L/F L −1 functions layer is inserted every 6 rounds. Before the first round and after the last round, there are pre-and post-whitening layers. In this paper we will consider a reduced variant of Camellia without F L/F L −1 functions and whitening layers. The Feistel structure of the r-th round is
where function F consists of a key-addition layer, a substitution transformation S and a diffusion layer P . The S transformation contains 4 types of 8×8 S-boxes s 1 , s 2 , s 3 and s 4 as follows:
The transformation P : ({0, 1}
. This transformation and its inverse, P −1 , are defined as: Table 2 .
Analysis of Wu et al.'s Attack on Camellia-128
In step (3.c.iii) of Section 4.1 in [22] , the authors write: "Furthermore, the probability that a subkey guess may remain after this test is about (1 − 2 −8 )." At the first look, it seems to be true, but we show that this statement and thus the resulted complexity are not true. We show that the correct value for this probability is (1 − 2 −68 ), and also we calculate the dominant part of the time complexity of the attack on Camellia-128 proposed in [22] .
At the end of step (3.b) there remain 2 5+m pairs. Below, we specify the list and the number of subkeys that are determined for each of these pairs:
1. Only one value for subkey bytes (k 
Thus, the number of 76-bit target subkeys that satisfy the impossible differential for each of the 2 5+m remaining pairs is 1
Thus, the probability that a 76-bit target subkey guess be discarded by each of these 2 5+m pairs is . If we choose m = 9, as [22] proposes, the number of remaining wrong subkeys becomes:
If we accept that only one wrong subkey remains, m can be obtained as below:
Thus, the number of the required chosen plaintexts is about 2 m+56 = 2 124.7 . Also the dominant part of time complexity which is related to step 2, will be about 2 50 × 2 124.7 = 2 174.7 memory accesses. Hence, this attack is infeasible. It seems that there is a similar mistake in computing the complexity of the attack on Camellia-256 proposed in [22] .
Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Camellia-128
In this section, we first present the 8-round impossible differential of Camellia introduced in [23] , then we propose an impossible differential attack on 12-
functions. Finally, we analyze the complexity of our attack in Section 3.4.
8-Round Impossible Differentials of Camellia
In 2007, Wu et al. [23] found the following 8-round impossible differentials of Camellia: (0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0, a|0|0|0|0|0|0|0)→ 8 (h|0|0|0|0|0|0|0, 0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0), where a and h are any two non-zero bytes. Fig. 2 illustrates more details. A detailed explanation of these 8-round impossible differentials is given in [23] . 
Some Observations on the Key Schedule of Camellia-128
Redundancy in the Key Schedule: We first consider the relation between the target subkeys in our attack. The 18-byte target subkeys include the 8 bytes of k 1 , the byte k in the last round. This fact has previously been considered in [22] .
Relation between k L and k A : Since in our attack some bits of k A are recovered, here we investigate the relation between the master key of Camellia-128,
In other words, we will show that k L can be extracted from k A . According to the key schedule of Camellia-128, k R is zero. Let the outputs of round functions F in first and second rounds of the key schedule be denoted by x and y, respectively. According to Fig. 1 , we can obtain x and y as functions of only k A as below:
In a same way k L can be represented in terms of x and y as below:
C1 (x) So according to above equations we can obtain the master key of Camellia-128,
Hence, the complexity of obtaining k L from k A is about four 1-round Camellia encryptions.
Impossible Differential Attack on 12-Round Camellia-128
In this section, we present the first successful impossible differential attack on 12 rounds of Camellia-128 without the F L/F L −1 functions and whitening. We Fig. 3 . Equivalent structure for one round of Camellia attack Rounds 1 to 12, and use the 8-round impossible differential in Rounds 3 to 10. The attack is illustrated in Fig. 4 . For the sake of simplicity, in Fig. 4 we use the equivalent round functions of Camellia in the Rounds 1, 2 and 12. The equivalent round function, which is shown in Fig. 3 , is obtained by moving the P function to the output of the XOR operation and applying a transformation P −1 to the data line entering the XOR operation. According to Fig. 3 , the equivalence of this modified structure to the original version can be verified easily as below:
In a traditional impossible differential attack where there exist additional rounds on both sides of the impossible differential, the attacker first checks a series of conditions in one side and choose pairs (or keys) that satisfy these conditions. She moves to the other side when she finishes checking all the conditions in the first side. When analyzing the Camellia, we observed that its structure allows us to change the side before finishing the investigation of all the conditions of one side. Thus we can check the condition that filters a greater number of pairs (or keys) before the other conditions. This strategy reduces the time complexity without any effect on the data complexity. So in the proposed attack, we first check some conditions in Round 1, then we conduct the attack in Rounds 12 and 11, and then we return to Rounds 1 and 2. The attack procedure is as follows:
1. Take 2 n structures of plaintexts such that each structure contains 2 (a) Guess the 8-bit value of k 1 1 and partially encrypt every remaining plaintext pair to get ∆W 1 in the output of the XOR of Round 1 (see Fig. 4 ). Keep only the pairs whose ∆W 1 is zero. The probability of this event is 2 −8 , thus we expect about 2 n+39 × 2 −8 = 2 n+31 pairs remain.
(
to get ∆W l . Keep only the pairs whose ∆W l is equal to y (consider that y is already determined by ∆R 0 for each plaintext pair). The probability of this event for each l is 2 −8 , thus the expected number of remaining pairs is 2 n+31 × 2 −8×4 = 2 n−1 . 4. In this step consider the corresponding ciphertext pairs (C, C * ) of the remaining pairs then perform the following substeps:
(a) Guess the 8-bit value of k 12 1 . Notice that according to Table 3 1 is equal to g, where g is already determined by ∆R 12 for each ciphertext pair (see Fig. 4 ). The probability of this event is 2 −8 , thus the expected number of remaining pairs is 2 n−41 × 2 −8 = 2 n−49 . In this stage of the attack, for every 72-bit guess of the subkeys k 6. In this step, consider the corresponding plaintext pairs (P, P * ) of the remaining pairs then obtain the 24-bit value of k 1 4,6,7 (Notice that according  to Table 3 , all these 24 bits are already fixed by k 12 4,5,6,7,8 Fig. 4 ). If there exists a pair that passes this test, i.e. a pair that meets the input difference of the 8-round impossible differential, then discard the 76-bit subkey guess, and try another; otherwise for every 76-bit subkey guess, exhaustively search for the remaining 52 bits to recover the whole of k A . Considering the relation between k L and k A , described in Section 3.2, this will lead to recovering the master key k L .
Complexity of the Attack
In step 7, the probability that the difference ∆S According to procedure described in section 3.3 the time complexity (in terms of encryption units) of steps 3-7 for recovering 76 bits of k A is as follows:
Step 3(a) : 2 × 1 8
Step 3(b) :
Step 4(a) :
Step 4(b) : 2 × 1 8
Step 4(c) :
Step 4(d) : 2 × 3 8
Step 5 : 2 × 1 8
Step 6 : 2 × 3 8
Step 7 : 2 × encryptions. In order to recover the whole of master key (k L ), for each of the 76-bit candidates (outputs of the procedure described in Section 3.3 which is expected to be about ) we have to exhaustively search the remaining 52 bits of k A . Then using the second result of Section 3.2, we can obtain k L for each of these 52-bit guesses. As we described in Section 3.2, this operation requires about × 4 × 2 52 × 1 12 encryptions. Also one additional encryption is required to check the key with a plaintext/ciphertext pair. Finally, the overall time complexity to recover the master key is about 2 118.7 + × 2 52 × ( 4 12 + 1) . For = 1, the complexity will be about 2 118.7 encryptions. If we let the be about 2 62 , then n will be equal to 60.3. Thus, data complexity of the proposed attack reduces to 2 n+56 = 2 116.3 and the dominant time complexity is composed of the time complexity of steps 2, 3(a), 3(b) 
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new impossible differential attack on 12-round Camellia-128 without the F L/F L −1 functions. The attack uses a previously known 8-round impossible differential to retrieve the whole of the master key. The proposed attack exploits the redundancy in the key schedule of Camellia-128 to reduce the complexity. In this attack also we use the strategy of moving between the additional rounds in a zigzag path to accelerate the filtration of wrong pairs for each key guesses. Using these techniques along with a hash table to simplify the selection of proper pairs, the proposed attack requires about 2
116.3
plaintexts, and has a time complexity equivalent to about 2 116.6 encryptions. Our attack is the first successful impossible differential attack on 12 rounds of Camellia-128.
